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Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI
Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step In
The Right Direction
Nancy D. Polikoff

The most contested issue in contemporary family policy in
the United States is whether married couples should receive resources, support, and legal recognition denied to other family
forms.' The American Law Institute ("ALI") stepped into this
cultural divide with the publication of its Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution ("Principles"). 2 The culmination of twelve
years of study, the Principles articulate a set of rules designed to
achieve fairness when a family dissolves. At more than 1,100
pages, the Principles address, in painstaking detail, the allocation of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility for children,
the payment of child support, the division of property, and the
transfer of funds as compensatory spousal payments. 3 The provisions concerning custody and child support assume a virtually
indifferent stance towards the marital status of the child's parents. 4 This, of course, mirrors current law. The Principles diverge
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I am deeply
grateful to my three research assistants, Amy Stewart, WCL 2004, Laura Astrada, WCL
2005, and Kelly Barrett, WCL 2005, for agreeing to help me follow my tangents wherever
they took me, even at a moment's notice.
1 For a paradigmatic face-off between these two perspectives, compare the Institute
for American Values, available online at <http'/www.americanvalues.org> (visited Apr 9,
2004), and the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, available online at
<http'//www.marriagedebate.com> (visited Apr 9, 2004), with the Council on Contemporary Families, available online at <http'//www.contemporaryfamilies.org> (visited Apr 9,
2004),
and the
Alternatives
to
Marriage
Project,
available
online
at
<http'//www.unmarried.org> (visited Apr 9, 2004).
2 Consider American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations (LexisNexis 2002) (hereinafter "ALI Principles").
3 Consider ALI Principles (cited in note 2).
4 See ALI Principles § 2.01 comment a at 92. (cited in note 2) (explaining that while
the rules of this chapter were written primarily to address disputes over children arising
during divorce proceedings, the same disputes arise between parents who were never
married and therefore these rules apply to them as well); id § 3.01 comment b at 410
(stating that "[u]nder these Principles, a parent's support obligation to a child does not
vary according to the parents' legal or social relationship").
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from current law in most states, however, by extending to separating couples who meet the definition of "domestic partners" the
5
same economic consequences applicable to divorcing spouses.
This is an important step in the right direction of making
marriage matter less, an endeavor I have elsewhere called "ending marriage as we know it."6 It is also a step that has provoked
substantial criticism. Part I of this Article describes the ALI's
definition of domestic partners. I largely applaud the criteria established in the Principles, especially the availability of the designation of domestic partners to non-conjugal couples. Parts II
and III address the primary categories of criticism leveled
against the ALI approach. Part II considers the stance that marriage is a relationship superior to other relationships that should
thereby enjoy a privileged status in the law. Adherents to this
position diverge on one critical point-whether to allow same-sex
couples to marry. Most, however, object to the parity between
marriage and domestic partnership in the Principles. Ideologically, I disagree with those who would elevate marriage to a
status above other relationships. I hold this view regardless of
whether same-sex couples can marry.
Part III addresses criticism based upon a reluctance to ascribe to a couple a status they have not chosen for themselves.
Such criticism rejects the status-based approach of the ALI,
claiming that it violates autonomy, freedom of choice, and contract principles. I refute this objection by debunking the notion
that a couple that marries embraces distinct economic consequences. Because couples do not have accurate knowledge of the
economic significance of marrying, it is false logic to oppose adjusting the economic status of domestic partners on the theory
that the partners have avoided marriage to avoid specific economic ramifications.
In Part III, I also compare American developments in this
area with those in Canada, where little difference exists in the
legal treatment of spouses and cohabiting same-sex and oppositesex couples. In the United States, critics of ascription by and
large also value marriage above other relationships. In Canada,
criticism of ascription comes without such ideological baggage. In
a regime with little social or legal discrimination based upon a
couple's marital status, it might make sense to settle disputes
5 Consider id § 6 at 907-44 (describing the Principles of domestic partnership and
their relation to legal marriage).
6 Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending MarriageAs We Know It, 32 Hofstra L Rev 201 (2003).
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between unmarried partners under a legal framework slightly
different from that established by the ALI.
I. QUALIFYING AS A DOMESTIC PARTNER

The ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution define
as domestic partners two individuals who are "not married to one
another, who for a significant period of time share a primary
residence and a life together as a couple." 7 When two people have
a common child and have "maintained a common household" for
a specific length of time, called the "cohabitation parenting period," they are domestic partners.8 This is an irrebuttable designation. 9
Any other determination of domestic partnership rests upon
presumptions. Thus, a domestic partnership for those without a
child is presumed when a couple "maintain[s] a common household" for a specific length of time called the "cohabitation period."
This period is longer for childless couples than it is for couples
with a common child. 10 The presumption does not apply if the
two people are related by blood or adoption."
The Principles list thirteen factors that can rebut the presumption created by the length of cohabitation. 12 These same
thirteen factors can prove the existence of a domestic partnership
if the length of time, with or without a child, has been too short
to trigger the presumption, or if the two persons are related by
13
blood or adoption.
The thirteen factors are illustrative of "all the circumstances" that would determine whether the two persons "share a
7 ALI Principles § 6.03(1) at 916 (cited in note 2).
8 The Principles do not establish the length of time, but instead specify that the

duration should be set in a "rule of statewide application." Id § 6.03(2) at 916. In the
commentary to this section, the ALI uses the period of two years. Id § 6.03 comment d at
921. The couple "maintains a common household" when they live "only with each other
and family members," or when they "act jointly, rather than as individuals, with respect
to management of the household" if they live with others. Id § 6.03(4) at 916-17.
9 "When parties have lived together in a common household for a specified uniform
period of time with a child of both of them, they are domestic partners.... When parties
are not the co-parents of a child, but have shared a common household for a specified
period of time, they are presumed to be domestic partners." ALI Principles Ch 1, Overview of Ch 6 at 35 (emphasis added).
10 Again, the Principles do not establish the required length of time. Id § 6.03(3) at
916. The commentary uses three years and calls this a "reasonable choice." Id § 6.03
comment d at 921.
11 Id § 6.03(3) at 916.
12 ALI Principles § 6.03(7) at 917-18 (cited in note 2).
13 Id § 6.03(6) at 917.
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life together as a couple." 14 They include written and oral statements and promises made to one another about the relationship;' 5 representations made to third parties about the relationship, as well as the couple's reputation in the community as a
couple; 16 commingling of finances; 17 economic interdependence,
or dependence of one person on the other; 8 assumption by the
parties of specialized or collaborative roles;' 9 changes in the life
of either or both engendered by the relationship; 20 naming of
each other as financial beneficiaries and naming each other in
documents, such as wills; 2' participation in a commitment cere23
mony or partnership registration;22 joint caretaking of a child;
24
and the parties' "emotional or physical intimacy."
For the most part, the ALI does a good job of capturing the
characteristics of relationships that should trigger property division and spousal support rules applicable to the dissolution of
marriages. The Principles identify "emotional or physical intimacy" and make this only one factor that determines whether
the parties share a life together as a couple. 25 A sexual relationship, therefore, is not a prerequisite for domestic partnership.
The Principles do not presume a domestic partnership between
family members related by blood or adoption because two such
persons are less likely to live together as a "couple." Nonetheless,
two such family members might lead the kind of entwined lives
contemplated by the ALI, and, when they do, the marital dissolu26
tion principles properly apply.
When a sexual relationship exists between the couple, the
exclusivity of that relationship figures nowhere in the Principles'
criteria. This is appropriate. Critics have commented that a court
requiring monogamy to recognize a couple's legal status 27 im14 Id § 6.03(7) at 917.
15 Id §
16 ALI
17 Id §
18 Id §
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

6.03(7)(a) at 917.
Principles § 6.03(7)(i) at 918 (cited in note 2).
6.03(7)(b) at 917.
6.03(7)(c) at 917.

Id § 6.03(7)(d) at 917.
ALl Principles § 6.03(7)(e) at 917 (cited in note 2).
Id § 6.03(7)(f) at 917.
Id § 6.03(7)(j) at 918.
Id § 6.03(7)(1) at 918.
ALl Principles § 6.03(7)(h) at 917 (cited in note 2).
Id (emphasis added).
Id § 6.03 comment d at 920-21.
See Braschi v Stahl Associates, 543 NE2d 49, 54-55 (1989) (suggesting that mo-

nogamy, among other factors, should be considered when determining whether a same-
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poses a value that married couples are free to reject. 28 Although
married couples also can reject the intermingling of finances that
the Principles consider, this element, as one factor of thirteen, is
unlikely to torpedo an appropriate determination of the existence
of a domestic partnership.
Of some concern is the absolute requirement that the couple
live together. Married couples, of course, can live separately. The
commentary explains the reason for this requirement as follows:
"The purpose is to exclude casual and occasional relationships, as
well as extramarital relationships conducted by married persons
who continue to reside with a spouse."29 The Principles also require that the couple's residence serve as the "primary abode" of
both parties. 30 Although domestic partners will usually share a
common primary residence, in some instances the thirteen criteria listed in this section would point towards the presence of a
domestic partnership even in the absence of a common primary
residence.
The Principles could achieve their purpose by requiring a
shared primary residence for a presumption of domestic partnership, rather than making it an absolute requirement. No "casual
and occasional" relationship could meet the standard established
by the thirteen criteria. A difficulty would remain, however, in
identifying the date upon which the partnership began for purposes of determining domestic-partnership property available for
division. The Principles focus on the date on which the partners
begin living together to facilitate this determination. 3 1 In the absence of such a concrete marker, assessment of the relevant time
period would be more subjective. The Principles could account for
this by again placing the burden of establishing which property
is the property of the domestic partnership on the person seeking
a determination of domestic partnership when the couple did not
share a primary residence.
Under the ALI, once a domestic partnership is established,
dissolution of that relationship takes place under a regime alsex couple constitutes a "family").
28 Mary Ann Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the
Legal History of Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va L Rev 1643, 1665 (1993)
(noting that "[a] marriage certificate now allows heterosexual couples to have an open
marriage... without having their commitment or the legal benefits that follow from it
challenged").
29 ALI Principles § 6.03 comment c at 919 (cited in note 2).
30 Id.

31 Id § 6.04(2)(a) at 938.
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most identical to that which governs divorce, including presumptively equal division of property and the availability of compensatory payments. 32 As with married couples, those who wish to
arrange the economic consequences of their relationship under
33
other principles may opt out through contract.

II. DEBATING WHETHER MARRIAGE SHOULD BE VALUED ABOVE
OTHER RELATIONSHIPS

A.

The Ideological Critics

Ideological opposition to the Principles' Domestic Partners
chapter has surfaced in both scholarly and popular publications.
Ideological opponents see the legal recognition of a nonmarital
relationship as an attack on marriage. "[The ALI] want[s] marriage to mean nothing," says Representative Marilyn Musgrave,
34
Congressional sponsor of the Federal Marriage Amendment.
John Leo, writing in U.S. News and World Report, blasts the
"drastic notion" in the ALI Principles that "marriage is just one
arrangement among many. "35 Brigham Young law professor
Lynn Wardle says the Principles "reflect an ideological bias
against family relations based on marriage" 36 and a continuation
of "the war on the traditional family and traditional sexual morality that has been waged over three decades. '37 As Bush Administration welfare policy advisor Ron Haskins expressed it
most succinctly, "[ciohabitation is a plague and we should do

what we can do [sic] discourage

it."38

According to this point of view, law and social policy should
promote marriage. Recognizing an option other than marriage
dilutes and downgrades marriage. 39 Extending the benefits of
32 The ALI replaces alimony, and its murky theoretical underpinnings in contempo-

rary life, with the concept of equitable allocation of financial loss incurred by a party as a
result of that party's membership in a marital unit. Consider id § 5.
33 ALI Principles § 7.02 at 954 (cited in note 2).
34 Pete Winn, 'They Want Marriage to Mean Nothing', CitizenLink (Oct 15, 2003),
available online at <http://www.family.org/cforum/feature/a0028405.cfm> (visited Feb 22,
2004).
35 John Leo, Marriageon the Rocks, US News & World Rep 47 (Dec 16, 2002).
36 Robert Pear, Legal Group Urges States to Update Their Family Law, NY Times Al
(Nov 30, 2002).
37 Leo, Marriageon the Rocks, US News & World Rep at 47 (cited in note 35).
38 Sheerly Avni, Unwedded Bliss, Salon.com (Jan 9, 2003), available online at
<http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2003/01/10/anti-marriage/> (visited Feb 20, 2004).
39 Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will Proliferationand Recognition of Domestic Partnerships Affect Marriage?,4 J L & Fam Stud 105, 107-10 (2002).
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marriage to unmarried couples promotes cohabitation and weakens the institution of marriage, which is contrary to the best interests of society. 40 Marriage is uniquely suited to advance the
goals of childrearing and protecting women, and therefore, the
41
disincentive to marriage in the ALI Principles is a mistake. Citing empirical data, ideological opponents assert that cohabitants
invest less in each other than do married couples and focus on
the short term rather than the long term.42 Cohabitation is less
stable than marriage, they assert. 43 The law, therefore, should
encourage marriage, not cohabitation. 44
Most ideological opponents of the ALI Domestic Partners
Chapter want to limit the status of marriage to only heterosexual
couples. To these critics, the ALI Principles are a mistake because they validate gay and lesbian relationships 45 and move
46
society closer to allowing same-sex marriage.
Some opposition to the recognition of domestic partnerships,
however, comes from gay rights supporters. These commentators
want marriage to retain its elevated status in the law and want
same-sex couples to be able to marry.4 7 Although such opposition
40 Lynn D. Wardle, DeconstructingFamily: A Critiqueof the American Law Institute's
"DomesticPartners"Proposal, 2001 BYU L Rev 1189, 1222-32.
41 William C. Duncan, Domestic PartnershipLaws in the United States: A Review and
Critique,2001 BYU L Rev 961, 987-92. See also Courtenay Edelhart, Unmarriedsat Risk,
Indianapolis Star El (Jan 27, 2003) (quoting opposition to the ALI Principles from the
president of the Indiana Family Institute who said, "all the research shows that children
do best in families with two married parents.... Anything that codifies or accommodates
situations that are less than ideal does not represent the best interests of children").
42 See Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership:Missing the Target, 4 J L & Fain
Stud 19, 24-25 (2002).
43 Id at 23 and n 39.
44 Consider id. See also Lynn Wardle, Is Marriage Obsolete?, 10 Mich J Gender & L
189, 214 (2003) (arguing that "[wihile marriage and family relations are far from perfect,
they are incomparably superior to any other model of a companionate or nurturing relationship. While there is some reason for caution about the risks of marriage and marriage-based families, there is no rational basis for believing that any other intimate or
nurturing relationship can do as well").
45 Leo, Marriageon the Rocks, US News & World Rep at 47 (cited in note 35).
46 Duncan, 2001 BYU L Rev at 985-86 (cited in note 41). See also Wardle, 10 Mich J
Gender & L at 219 (cited in note 44). Wardle states:
The union of two persons of different genders creates something of unique potential strengths and inimitable potential value to society. It is the integration
of the universe of gender differences (profound and subtle, biological and cultural, psychological and genetic) associated with sexual identity that constitutes
the core and essence of marriage.
Id.
47 Professor Margaret Brinig expressed to me in conversation a more equivocal perspective that opposes the ALI Principles and supports legal recognition of same-sex cou-
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to the recognition of domestic partnerships is an ideological position, it is not grounded in the superiority of opposite-sex marriage, either on moral grounds or as the only desirable unit in
which to raise children. Rather, it is grounded in the view that
only marriage expresses the ultimate commitment of the two
partners to one another and that it is good for both the couple
and society that this commitment be encouraged, rewarded, and
reinforced. 48 Adherents of this perspective are more nuanced in
their response to the ALI Domestic Partners chapter.
For example, Professor Elizabeth Scott, who supports samesex marriage, argues:
Law makers should (continue to) treat formal marriage as
special, not because it is morally superior to other family
affiliations, but as a means of encouraging couples in or
contemplating committed unions to formalize their relationships and of rewarding them for doing so. Couples
who are ready to undertake commitment will be more
likely to marry if marriage offers some advantages over
cohabitation. Marital privilege also serves as compensation for the willingness of couples to undertake the obligations of marriage and to abide by its sharing and responsibility norms. Thus, under a well structured marital regime, government benefits and protections serve as quid
pro quo for the couple's agreement to alleviate society's
49
dependency burden.
Scott's defense of marriage is thus considerably more modest-a
word she herself uses 5 0-than that of the ideological defenders
who oppose same-sex marriage. Therefore, it is not surprising
that, although she opposes the ALI Domestic Partners Chapter,
she does not wish to leave separating unmarried couples in their
current legal morass of ill-suited contract and property reme5
dies. 1
pies through some mechanism other than marriage, such as civil unions.
48 Consider Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of
Marriage and Cohabitation,76 Notre Dame L Rev 1435 (2001).
49 Elizabeth Scott, Marriage, Cohabitationand Collective Responsibilityfor Dependency, 2004 U Chi Legal F 225, 252.
50 Id ("The social utility of marriage justifies a modest incentive-and compensationbased privilege; it does not justify stigmatizing distinctions.").
51 Scott proposes a default framework under which two individuals who have lived
together for at least five years are presumed to have contract-based obligations towards
one another, and the party wishing to challenge such a regime must demonstrate that the
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Professor Milton Regan has articulated his support for the
privileged position of marriage through numerous books and articles over many years, and he also supports same-sex marriage.5 2 "[L]aw need not be agnostic among types of intimate relationships," he writes.5 3 The law should promote marriage because marriage expresses the importance of intimate commitment and such commitment is necessary for individual stability
and unity of self over time.5 4 "For intimate commitment to be
constitutive of identity ...requires that it be seen as something
that derives its value from a source outside of the self's choice to
engage in it." 55 The legal institution of marriage provides that
source of validation.
Professor Regan resists the option of domestic partner registration that would confer some, but not all, of the benefits and
obligations of marriage. Rather, he suspects that commitment is
a binary concept, either present or absent, and that the law
would not encourage commitment if it implied that partners
could pick and choose among levels of responsibility towards one
56
another.
Professor Regan acknowledges that some of the impetus for
recognition of domestic partners stems from a desire to recognize
committed same-sex relationships. 57 Marriage would be the preferable approach because it would serve "the goal of preserving
the distinctiveness of marriage and avoiding blurring its differences with unmarried intimate relationships."53 He also postu-

parties' intent was not to undertake marital obligations. Id at 253.
52 See, for example, Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law, Marriage,and Intimate Commitment,
9 Va J Soc Pol & L 116 (2001); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuitof Intimacy (NYU 1993); Regan, 76 Notre Dame L Rev 1435 (cited in note 48).
53 Regan, 76 Notre Dame L Rev at 1438 (cited in note 48).
54 Id at 1442-46.
5 Id at 1445.
56 Id at 1463.
57 Regan, 76 Notre Dame L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 48).
58 Id at 1463. Some in the gay community support this perspective as well. Writing in
favor of same-sex marriage in the New York Times Magazine, Jonathan Rauch, writer in
residence at the Brookings Institution, states:
Marriage is indeed the bedrock of civilization.. .. A marriage license uniquely
bestows many hundreds of entitlements and entanglements that publicly affirm
the spouses' mutual responsibility.... Marriage, like voting and other core civic
responsibilities, is strongest when universal .... Allowing and expecting marriage for all Americans would show respect for the welfare and equality of all
Americans, and it would protect the institution of marriage from the proliferation of alternatives (civil unions, domestic partner benefits and socially ap-
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lates that the pressure for domestic partner recognition would
abate if gay men and lesbians could marry.5 9
Professor Regan's viewpoint leads him to evaluate separately each dimension of the legal treatment of unmarried couples. In general, he favors recognition when doing so reinforces
"an ethic of care and commitment." 0 Thus, with respect to claims
between partners whose relationships involve financial and emotional interdependence, he believes that the ALI gets it right because "individuals may have responsibilities of care toward one
another that arise not simply from consent but by virtue of a
shared life, whatever legal form it takes."6 '
B.

Responding to the Ideological Critics

There are two distinct responses to the ideological opponents
of the ALI Principles. Since such opponents argue that marriage
is a more valuable relationship than domestic partnership, one
can respond by disagreeing with that assertion. This is the approach that I take. Alternatively, one can meet the objections of
the ideological opponents by agreeing that marriage presents a
more desirable relationship, but also arguing that the implementation of the Domestic Partners chapter merely recognizes the
reality of people's lives and does not diminish the importance of
marriage. The ALI itself, as well as the main drafters of the
Principles, have adopted this approach when defending their
work against ideological attacks. Because family law has a history of adapting to changing families, most notably in the recognition currently provided to children born out of wedlock, this
proved cohabitation) that a continued ban on same-sex marriage will inevitably
bring-is, in fact, bringing already.
Jonathan Rauch, Power of Two, NY Times Magazine 13-14 (Mar 7, 2004).
59 Regan, 76 Notre Dame L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 48). Elizabeth Scott makes this
assertion more forcefully:
Today, the most compelling arguments against privileging marriage over nonmarital unions are made on behalf of same-sex couples. Courts extending rights
based on family status to partners in same-sex relationships are clearly moved
by the unfairness of the discriminatory exclusion that these couples face. If
same sex couples are allowed to marry, the argument becomes a narrower (and
much weaker) claim on behalf of parties in informal unions who have the option
to marry but choose not to do so.
Scott, 2004 U Chi Legal F at 238 (cited in note 49).
60 Regan, 76 Notre Dame L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 48).
61 Id at 1451.
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approach has a respectable pedigree. First I will describe such
approach, and then I will differentiate my approach from it.
1.

Defending the ALI Domestic PartnerPrinciplesas a
practicalresponse to changing family demographics.

The comment section of the Domestic Partners chapter succinctly states: "Although society's interests in the orderly administration of justice and the stability of families are best
served when the formalities of marriage are observed, a rapidly
increasing percentage of Americans form domestic relationships
without such formalities." 62 The main drafters of the Principles,
Ira Ellman and Grace Ganz Blumberg, have said repeatedly that
the ALI intended to adapt family law to meet the changes in the
family-to make the law take account of social changes. 63 "The
more frequent such relationships become, the more the law
64
should be concerned."
Professors Ellman and Blumberg note that it does not hurt
married people to have the law recognize relationships between
unmarried people. 65 "[The ALI] does not oppose marriage," says
Professor Blumberg. 66 In fact, the Principles note that the extension of the law to govern the dissolution of domestic partnerships
could promote marriage by removing the preservation of economic autonomy from the list of reasons why someone might
choose not to marry.67 Thus, the drafters support the domestic
partner provisions as extending equity and justice to those who
actually live in nonmarital partnerships without defending the
positive good of such relationships.
The logic and coherence of this position derive significant
support from a different issue in family law: equal legal status
for children born to married couples and those born to unmarried
women. No one seriously disputes that legal principle today, although its implementation, beginning in the 1960s, toppled centuries of traditions and values. 68 Nonetheless, supporters of the
62 ALI Principles § 6.02 comment a at 914 (cited in note 2).
63 See, for example, Pear, Legal Group Urges States to Update Their Family Law, NY
Times at Al (cited in note 36).
64 ALI Principles Ch 1, Overview of Ch 6 at 33 (cited in note 2).
65 Edelhart, Unmarriedsat Risk, Indianapolis Star at El (cited in note 41).
66 Id.
67 ALI Principles § 6.02 comment b at 916 (cited in note 2).
68 See Uniform Parentage Act, Prefatory Note, 9B ULA 378 (1973) ("When work on
this Act began, the notion of substantive legal equality of children regardless of the mari-
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mainstream position of treating all children as legitimate do not
thereby embrace the positive good of out-of-wedlock childbearing. 69 Rather, they accept the reality of contemporary life and
articulate the principles of equality, equity, and justice that underlie our current statutory and legal regime.7 0 The ALI can
proudly stand behind analogous reasoning.
Some would dismiss this analogy. They would argue that
children bear no responsibility (or guilt) for their out-of-wedlock
birth and so should not suffer disadvantages because of it. Such
advocates might argue that, on the other hand, unmarried couples should face the consequences of choosing a disfavored family
form. This reasoning ignores the ideology that supported the
harsh distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children
7
for centuries, indeed millennia. '
tal status of their parents seemed revolutionary if one considered existing state law on
this subject.").
69 Noting that "the historical practice of inflicting upon the children the social stigma
and legal disabilities resulting from their parents' irresponsible procreative behavior is no
longer acceptable," Professor Wardle defends heterosexual marriage as the only appropriate family form in which to raise children and specifically comments that "the formal
'abolition of illegitimacy' in American law does not mean that society no longer is concerned about or willing to regulate procreation to encourage birth within marriage." Lynn
D. Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriagein Light of the State
Interests in MaritalProcreation,24 Harv J L & Pub Pol 771, 790 (2001).
70 See Johan Meeusen, Judicial Disapproval of DiscriminationAgainst Illegitimate
Children, 43 Am J Comp L 119, 145 (1995) Meeusen writes:
The fundamental change in attitude towards illegitimates can probably be explained by a concurrent shift in societal organization (important rise in the
number of births out of wedlock), values (rights-consciousness and valueneutrality of the western societies) and perceptions (refusal to victimize the innocent child, reflecting the strong anti-discrimination sensitivity present in the
western societies since a few decades). It would require the collaboration of a
sociologist and a historian to fully explain those recent evolutions. But a mere
reading of the Supreme Court and European Court decisions clarifies both
Courts' choice to give priority to fairness to the child, instead of strictly adhering to public values as agreed upon by the different (state and national) legislative bodies. Both Courts refused to deny the importance of encouraging stable
and "legitimate" family relationships. But in the light of the contemporary emphasis on individual rights, and also the growing hesitation to infringe upon
private lifestyle decisions, that goal could not be invoked to justify unequal protection.
Id.
71 See Harry D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 1-2 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971)
(noting the preference for children of legitimate birth in early law and stating that later,
because the church considered monogamous marriage the only proper forum for sexual
intercourse, children begotten otherwise were "unlawful. ... 'Sins of the flesh' were discouraged, and illegitimates came to be viewed as sin turned into flesh"). See also Weber v
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 406 US 164, 175 (1972) ("The status of illegitimacy has
expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
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The principle that the sins of the fathers should be visited
upon their children has ancient roots in Judeo-Christian tradition. The Ten Commandments instruct that those who do not
worship the one God will incur consequences that will be visited
upon their grandchildren and great-grandchildren. 72 The common law rule that a child born out of wedlock was filius nullius,
the child of no one, condemned children for the sin of their parents. 73 The notion that such children are innocent and concomitantly entitled to protection under the law supplants centuries of
tradition in favor of a better principle--one that reflects modern
values of equality and justice.
Furthermore, the law recognizes the rights of parents of
children born out of wedlock, the very people whose "sins" led to
the centuries of distinction. On the very day that the Supreme
Court found it unconstitutional to deny children born out of wed74
lock the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother,
it also found it unconstitutional to deny the mother of an out-ofwedlock child the right to recover for her child's wrongful
death. 75 The mother's "immorality" did not bar her claim. Similarly, courts have permitted fathers to inherit from their out-ofwedlock children, 76 and to recover in the event of their out-ofwedlock child's wrongful death. 77 Although the Supreme Court
has upheld some distinctions in this area, it has declined to do so
on grounds related to promotion of the traditional family or sex78
ual morality.
It seems accurate then to link relatively recent changes in
the legal status of out-of-wedlock children and their parents with
the ALI's proposed changes to the legal status of unmarried cou-

bonds of marriage.").
72 King James Bible, Exodus 20:2 "I am the LORD thy God, which have brought thee
out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage"; Exodus 20:3 "Thou shalt have no
other gods before me"; Exodus 20:4 "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or
any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that
is in the water under the earth"; Exodus 20:5 "Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them,
nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."
73 Sir William Blackstone, Commentarieson the Laws of England, Book I, Chapter 16
(1765).
74 Levy v Louisiana, 391 US 68, 71-72 (1968).
75 Glona v American Guarantee& Liability Insurance Co, 391 US 73, 75-76 (1968).
76 See Rainey v Chever, 510 SE2d 823 (Ga 1999).
77 See Glasco v Fireand Casualty InsuranceCo, 709 SW2d 550 (Mo App 1986).
78 Parhamv Hughes, 441 US 347 (1979).
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ples. Both are responses to social and demographic changes in
family composition. Neither necessarily applauds those changes.
2.

Defending the ALI Domestic PartnerPrinciplesas an
expression of the positive good of such relationships.

Unlike Professors Ellman and Blumberg, I am happy to defend the Principles as an expression of the positive good of nonmarital relationships.7 9 For reasons I have articulated elsewhere,
I support the abolition of marriage as a legal category; its religious or cultural status could continue for those who so choose.8 0
I do not believe that marriage is an inherently more valuable
relationship than others, including non-conjugal relationships
characterized by care and/or interdependence. 8 ' Without the
prospect of the elimination of legal marriage in sight, however, I
support removing the "special rights" conferred on marriage.
Rather, when relationships are relevant to the purpose of a law, I
support the inclusion within the law of all relationships that
82
achieve the law's purpose.
The most important objective of laws governing the financial
consequences of divorce is the just resolution of the economic
claims of parties.8 3 There would be no need for distinctive divorce
rules if traditional property and contract principles could justly
carry out this objective. Such principles fail, however, when the
79 See also Martha M. Ertman, The ALI Approach to Domestic Partnership,8 Duke J
Gender L & Pol 107, 110 (2001).
80 Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8
Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 167 (2000). See also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New Press 2004)
81 If forced to identify society's most important relationship, I would agree with Martha Fineman that the relationship between an inevitable dependent, most commonly a
child, and the person who cares for that dependent, most commonly a mother, is the bedrock relationship without which society could not continue. Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies
(Routledge 1995). To privilege a relationship between two adults based on their sexual
affiliation to one another misses the point.
82 1 owe much of the conceptual framework of this approach to a report of the Law
Commission of Canada. Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing
and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships (Dec 21, 2001), available online at
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/report.asp> (visited Apr 10, 2004) (hereinafter
"Beyond Conjugality"). I describe the methodology and discuss its current and potential
application to American law in Polikoff, 32 Hofstra L Rev 201 (cited in note 6).
83 The Director's Foreword to the ALI Principles notes that their work "attempts to
treat wives, husbands, and children fairly when the family dissolves." ALI Principles
Director's Foreword at xv (cited in note 2). The Principles list as the most important objective of the Domestic Partners chapter the "just resolution of the economic claims of
parties who qualify as. . . domestic partners." §6.02 comment b at 915.
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dispute grows out of lives intertwined in the shared endeavor of
an intimate family relationship. To achieve the objective of such
laws, all relationships sharing characteristics that make contract
and property remedies insufficient must be addressed by other
distinctive rules. The ALI's definition of who qualifies for this
status has mostly gotten it right.84
I am also willing to acknowledge that legal recognition of
nonmarital relationships expresses acceptance of such relationships, and that this is a good thing. Thus, I agree with Professor
Gary Spitko, who makes the analogous point in his analysis of
the extension of intestacy law to include same-sex couples.8 5 Professor Spitko notes that the exclusion of same-sex couples from
the rules of intestate succession in Article II of the Uniform Probate Code serves a powerful expressive function-a silence he
86
deems "deafening in its devaluation of gay relationships."
Drafters revising Article II to include same-sex couples could
profess to base their revision on the reality of such relationships
87
and could disclaim an intent to promote such relationships.
Professor Spitko believes, however, that "inclusion would indicate that gay and lesbian relationships merit positive attention
and would be a powerful symbol that society accepts such rela88
tionships."
Professor Spitko points out that the Uniform Probate Code is
a "model code" studied by scholars and legislators, and students
who will be future scholars and legislators.8 9 In a similar vein,
the ALI Principles are, as their subtitle reflects, "recommendations." They are the American Law Institute offering "advice" to
84 See Part I.
85 E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of NonMaritalInclusion, 41 Ariz L Rev 1063 (1999).
86 Id at 1103.
87 Id at 1101.

88 Id at 1100. Spitko also writes:
It is a truism that the law teaches as it governs. The law has great potential to
teach and reinforce the values that ground it or appear to ground it. Those who
experience the law operating on them personally and those who observe the law
operating on others are likely to learn whom the law respects, ignores, privileges, and disadvantages. In this way, intestacy law not only reflects society's
familial norms but also helps to shape and maintain them. Thus, succession law
reform has great potential to change the way our society views gay men and
lesbians and, indeed, how gay men and lesbians view themselves.
Spitko, 41 Ariz L Rev at 1100-01 (cited in note 85).
89 Id at 1105 (emphasis in original).
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those seeking "fair" family law rules. 90 By including unmarried
opposite-sex and same-sex partners within its purview, the ALI
acknowledges that such relationships fall within the circle of relationships deemed family. And when addressing the dissolution
of such relationships, the ALI recommends that states not make
them "a stranger to its laws."91
III. CONSIDERING WHETHER TO ASCRIBE STATUS TO PARTIES WHO
DO NOT MARRY
A.

The Law Ascribes Status to Reflect Desired Norms

Others oppose the ALI Domestic Partners Chapter because
they disagree with a rule ascribing status to those who do not
choose it.92 These commentators assume that heterosexual conjugal couples who do not marry choose to forego the legal consequences of marriage, including those that would flow from the
dissolution of their relationship. This argument against status
imposition is attractive, given the premium we attach to personal
93
autonomy in deciding matters of family life.
Professor Marsha Garrison postulates that marital obligations derive from consent and are thereby contractual in nature.94 She argues that, empirically, cohabitation does not pro90 ALI Principles Director's Foreword at xvi (cited in note 2).
91 Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 635-36 (1996) (finding in violation of the Equal Protection Clause an amendment to the Colorado Constitution prohibiting any governmental
unit from enacting any law or policy protecting gay men and lesbians and deeming the
amendment a classification that made "a class of persons a stranger to its laws").
92 Consider Marsha Garrison, The "Root and Nerve" of Modern Ascriptive Cohabitation Law, presentation at the North American Regional Conference of the International
Society of Family Law, Eugene, Oregon, June 2003 (forthcoming) [on file with U Chi
Legal F]; Scott, 2004 U Chi Legal F at 225 (cited in note 49).
93 At the 2003 North American Regional Conference of the International Society of
Family Law, Professor Wardle offered a particularly tempting scenario. He postulated a
low income mother who lives with the father of her child but does not marry him because
she knows he is a financial risk-that he may turn out to be an economic liability rather
than an economic asset-and who thinks she has a better chance at a good life for herself
and her child if she is not encumbered by him. The prospect of a court awarding him
financial compensation when she finally decides to get rid of him seems unjust in the face
of her deliberate strategy to avoid financial entanglement. This would be troubling if
there were any prospect under the ALI Principles that she would actually bear some
financial responsibility for him, but she would not, regardless of whether she marries
him. He could not obtain ongoing support payments from her because such payments are
tied to economic loss that the person suffered through his or her investment in the family;
the man in this example suffered no such loss. As for property division, in this economically marginal family scenario there would be no property to divide.
94 Garrison, The "Root and Nerve" of Modern Ascriptive CohabitationLaw (cited in

note 92).
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vide evidence of agreement to assume marital obligations. 95 Under some of the circumstances identified by the ALI, she suggests, heterosexual couples do informally-rather than formally-consent to the assumption of marital obligations; these
cases warrant reinvigoration of common law marriage more
readily than ascription of status as defined by the ALI. 96 For
same-sex couples barred from marriage, she prefers either allowing them to marry or allowing formalization through other
means, such as civil unions. 97 Ascription, on the other hand, devalues marriage, a status entitled to privileged treatment because of its symbolic importance and its association with greater
"health, wealth, happiness, and stability" than that of cohabita98
tion.
Professor Garrison disputes the ALI's concern that ascription of status is necessary to compensate for the disparate bargaining power between a dependant woman and her male partner who does not marry her.99 She questions as an empirical
matter whether nonmarital cohabitation harms women and children. She speculates that the example of a woman who wants to
marry and a man who does not no longer presents an accurate
picture of cohabitation. 10 0
Similarly, Elizabeth Scott finds imposition of financial obligations on unchoosing parties paternalistic. She argues that a
contractual framework is more compatible with liberal values:
"Imposing a marriage-like status on cohabiting parties, as the
ALI Principles do, excludes an intimate affiliation that some parties might choose ....
Although an imposed status may sometimes beneficially deter exploitation of dependent partners, it
sacrifices the freedom of individuals to order their intimate
lives."'l0
95 Id.
96 For additional arguments for expanding common law marriage, consider Cynthia
Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 Or L Rev 709
(1996).
97 Garrison, The "Root and Nerve' of Modern Ascriptive CohabitationLaw (cited in
note 92).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100

Id.

101 Scott, 2004 U Chi Legal F at 262 (cited in note 49). Of course the ALI does permit
the parties to avoid financial entanglement through contract. Consider ALI Principles §7
(cited in note 2) (providing rules for pre-marital, post-marital and separation agreements
all of which would allow a couple to contract out of the substantive rules contained within
the Principles).
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Although Scott would modify the traditional contract approach to unmarried couples by presuming intent to assume
marital obligations if they live together for more than five
years, 10 2 another opponent of the ALI's ascription model, Professor David Westfall, adopts the pure contract approach. 103 Deploring the status approach of the ALI, he hails the "powerful contemporary movement to recognize the parties' freedom to contract about the terms of their relationship." 0 4 He would have
limited the Principles to those facilitating enforcement of the
agreements of nonmarital partners.
A fatal flaw exists in the reasoning that differentiates married and unmarried couples on the theory that the former agree,
in the manner of a contract, to economic obligations towards one
another. The flaw is the premise that those who marry or do not
marry accurately understand the legally enforceable economic
obligations that each will have towards the other. In our federal
system, it is not possible for this proposition to be true.
State laws establishing obligations between spouses vary
dramatically. In some states, but not all, spouses are liable to
third parties for the provision of necessaries to the other
spouse. 10 5 I doubt that marrying couples in Maryland and Michigan know they are not liable to hospitals for each other's medical
bills, 10 6 or that couples in New Jersey know they will indeed have
to pay their future spouse's medical bills if the spouse lacks sufficient funds. 0 7 Couples who settle in California likely do not
choose a community property regime, 08 and couples who settle in
New York likely do not choose common law property as their
form of ownership. 0 9 Moreover, spouses who move from California to New York are unlikely to know, let alone agree, that doing
so changes their economic relationship.

102 Scott, 2004 U Chi Legal F at 258 (cited in note 49).
103 Consider David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 76 Notre
Dame L Rev 1467 (2001).
104 Id at 1479.
105 Consider Twila L. Perry, The "Essentialsof Marriage:Reconsideringthe Duty of
Support and Services, 15 Yale J L & Feminism 1 (2003).
106 See Condore v Prince George's County, 425 A2d 1011 (Md 1981); North Ottawa
Community Hospital v Kleift, 578 NW2d 267 (Mich 1998).
107 See Jersey Shore Medical Center-FitkinHospital v Estate of Baum, 417 A2d 1003
(NJ 1980).
108 See Cal Fam Code § 2581 (West 2004)
109 See NY Dom Rel Law § 236 (McKinney 2004).
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Concerning expectations should they divorce, I doubt couples
know that some states will divide their property equally, some
will presume equal division, and others will follow an "equitable
distribution principle" that may be far from equal." 0 I doubt they
know that sexual infidelity will bar alimony in North Carolina
but not in New Jersey,"' or that in some states an adulterous
husband will have his transgression used against him in assessing alimony or property division, whereas in others it will be irrelevant." 2 I doubt they know that Delaware requires a showing
of dependency before awarding alimony, while Florida does
not. 1 3 I doubt a wife who supports her husband through medical
school in New York knows she will have a property claim to his
resulting earning ability if they divorce, or that a wife in Indiana
knows that, if she does the same, she cannot obtain even "reimbursement alimony" for her financial and nonfinancial contributions to his success." 4 For that matter, consider how many people think that all states recognize common law marriage and

110 Compare Ariz Rev Stat § 25-318 (2003) (awarding each party an undivided onehalf interest in the community property) with Ark Code Ann § 9-12-315 (Michie 2003)
(presuming an equal division of property unless it would be inequitable given several
listed factors) and 750 111 Comp Stat § 5/503(d) (2003) (directing court to divide property
in "just proportions").
111 Compare NC Gen Stat § 50-16.3A (2003) with NJ Stat Ann § 2A:34-23 (West 2003).
112 Compare Del Code Ann, Title 13, § 1512(c) (Supp 1990) (stating that alimony shall
be determined "without regard to marital misconduct") with NC Gen Stat § 50-16.3A(a)
(cited in note 95) (including "[tihe marital misconduct of either of the spouses" as a factor
for courts to consider when determining the amount of alimony).
113 Compare Del Code Ann, Title 13, § 1512(b)(1) (Supp 1990) with Fla Stat Ann §
61.08 (West 2003). Delaware is one of eight states that has adopted the alimony provisions of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which prohibits alimony for any period of
time unless the spouse seeking it "(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." 9A UTA § 308(a) (West
1998).
114 Compare O'Brien v O'Brien, 489 NE2d 712 (NY 1985) (finding "an interest in a
profession or professional career potential is marital property which may be represented
by direct or indirect contributions of the non-title-holding spouse, including financial
contributions and nonfinancial contributions made by caring for home and family") and
Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 A2d 189 (NY App 2001) (awarding wife 50 percent of husband's increased earning capacity because she supported him as he pursued his training
as a pediatric gastroenterologist) with Yoon v Yoon, 711 NE2d 1265 (Ind 1999) (concluding that it was improper for trial court to consider enhanced earning capacity of husband's medical practice as marital property) and In re Marriageof Roberts, 670 NE2d 72
(Ind App 1996) (refusing to treat advanced degree as marital property and ruling that
there was no concept of "reimbursement alimony" under which she could be compensated
for her financial and nonfinancial support of her husband while he went through school).
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that cohabitation for a period of time means that they are mar5
ried.11
Justifying or criticizing law on the basis of people's assumptions about the legal consequences of their choices is not a fruitful pursuit. Couples who marry cannot be said, in any meaningful way, to have agreed with each other in the manner of a contract to specific economic obligations, including those that follow
if the relationship ends. The wildly diverse policy determinations
represented in the legal frameworks encompassing the economic
consequences of marriage and divorce among the fifty states and
the District of Columbia suggest that lawmakers, not the
spouses, set the norms. 116 Lawmakers extending the property
and support frameworks that accompany divorce to domestic
partners also express a norm. As with marriages, if the parties
do not like the norm, they may contract around it.
B.

Lessons About Ascription from Canada

In the United States, arguments against ascription of status
through mechanisms like the ALI Domestic Partner Principles
come from scholars who believe that marriage is more special,
distinctive, and valuable than any other type of relationship.
While some would recognize same-sex marriages and others
would not-a huge distinction-all would encourage marriage.
The development of the law in Canada offers the opportunity to
consider arguments about ascription of status in a different ideological construct. Unmarried opposite-sex and same-sex couples
in Canada have a legal status very close to that of married couples. 1 7 In that climate, arguments about the benefits and burdens of ascription can be considered separately from the ideological arguments about the superiority of marriage.
115 Commentary in the Principles specifically notes: "Many Americans entertain the
widespread, albeit erroneous, belief that the mere passage of time transforms cohabitation into common-law marriage." ALI Principles § 6.02 comment a at 914 (cited in note 2).
See also Bowman, 75 Or L Rev at 711 (cited in note 96) (citing frequency of mistaken
belief that cohabitation for a period of years results in common law marriage).
116 The law does not protect the expectations of those who marry. The advent of nofault grounds for divorce changed the terms agreed to by those who married in an era
when an "innocent" spouse could be assured that the promise of "till death do us part"
was legally enforceable. The expectations of those who do not marry should not be valued
any higher. Society can determine that the norm of equitable treatment of the financial
consequences of relationship breakdown should trump any expectation that a chosen
course of action would have, or not have, specific legal consequences.
117 Consider Nicholas Bala, Controversy Over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of
Marriageand OtherAdult InterdependentRelationships,29 Queen's L J 41 (2003).
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Ideological arguments so prevalent in the United States
against legal recognition of nonmarital relationships have no
resonance in Canada. Unmarried heterosexual couples who live
together for anywhere between one and three years have legal
rights and obligations closely tracking those of married couples. 118 As in the United States, in Canada some aspects of family law are determined by provinces and some by the federal government, and so some regional differences arise. 119 The first recognition of unmarried couples came in a British Columbia statute passed in 1972 extending spousal support rights; 120 by way of
contrast, the ALI proposal to extend compensatory payments to
domestic partners would change the law of every American state.
Numerous Canadian statutes followed in the 1980s and early
1990s, conferring private obligations and also recognizing un2
married couples in matters such as inheritance and taxation.' '
122
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Miron v Trudel,
found the exclusion of an unmarried partner from the definition
of spouse for purposes of an automobile insurance policy unconstitutional. 23 Central in the rhetoric of the Court's opinion is a
belief in the equal value and dignity of nonmarital relationships. 124 Finding discrimination based upon marital status a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
Court stated that:
Discrimination on the basis of marital status touches the
essential dignity and worth of the individual in the same
way as other recognized grounds of discrimination violative of fundamental human rights norms. Specifically, it
touches the individual's freedom to live life with the mate
of one's choice in the fashion of one's choice. This is a mat118 Id at 47.
119 Susan B. Boyd and Claire F.L. Young, 'From Same-Sex to No Sex"?: Trends Towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in Canada, 1 Seattle J for Soc Just 757,
760 (2003).
120 Bala, 29 Queen's L J at 45-46.
121 Id at 47-59. Canadian commentators have expressed concern that the expansion of
recognition of cohabiting couples is part of a trend of privatizing the responsibility for
dependency and social and economic well-being once more firmly held by the state. See
Mary Jane Mossman, Conversations about Families in Canadian Courts and Lesgislatures: Are there Lessons for the United States?, 32 Hofstra L Rev 171; Boyd and Young, 1
Seattle J for Soc Just at 757 (cited in note 119).
122 [1995] 2 SCR 418 (Can).
123 Id.
124 Id at 420.
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ter of defining importance to individuals.... Discrimination on the basis of marital status may be seen as akin to
discrimination on the ground of religion, to the extent
that it finds its roots and expression in moral disapproval
of all sexual unions except those sanctioned by the church
125
and state.
Miron led to both federal and provincial legislation in a wide variety of areas, bringing partners cohabiting for a specified period
of time within the definition of "spouse."1 26 In 1999, the Supreme
Court of Canada found unconstitutional an Ontario statute extending spousal support benefits to unmarried heterosexual
partners but not to same-sex partners. 127 In that case, the Court
relied in part on its earlier recognition in Egan v Canada128 that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violated the
Charter. 129 In 2000, the Canadian Parliament amended sixtyeight federal laws to recognize as "common law partners" both
same-sex and opposite-sex couples who cohabit for at least a
30
year.1
This legal landscape affected the comprehensive analysis of
the law of personal adult relationships completed by the Law
Commission of Canada in 2001.131 With the status of unmarried
opposite-sex and same-sex couples virtually identical to that accorded to married couples, the Commission could consider more
broadly the legal treatment of close personal relationships among
adults. The Commission's report, Beyond Conjugality, argues
that the state should not automatically prefer conjugal over nonconjugal relationships. 132 Rather, every law that references a relationship should be examined to identify its purpose and to include within its scope all relationships relevant to achieving that
purpose. 133 The report takes for granted the equal value of married and unmarried, opposite-sex and same-sex, couples.
In such a legal and social climate, there is no need to support
ascription upon relationship breakdown as a first step towards
125

Id.

126
127
128
129
130
131

Bala, 29 Queen's L J at 48-59 (cited in note 117).
M v H, [19991 2 SCR 3 (Can).
Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 (Can).
M v H, [1999] 2 SCR at 3.
Bala, 29 Queen's L J at 56 (cited in note 117).
Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality (cited in note 82).

132

Id.
Id.

133
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legal recognition of the value of nonmarital relationships; such
recognition is firmly in place. In sharp contrast to the United
States, third parties, including the government, recognize the
rights of same-sex and opposite-sex couples for a variety of critical rights and benefits. Thus opposition in Canada to ascription
for purposes of resolving claims the two parties have against
each other when they separate (inter se claims) does not mask an
ideological agenda of promoting marriage above all other relationships. In fact, governmental recommendations to limit the
reach of ascription simultaneously urge enactment of registration schemes available to a wide range of relationships.
The Law Commission of Canada, in Beyond Conjugality, recommends extending marriage to same-sex couples' 34 and developing schemes that would allow those in both conjugal and nonconjugal relationships to register their relationships and thus
receive legal recognition. 135 Availability of marriage and registra36
tion promotes the principles of voluntariness and autonomy.
Registration reduces the need of the government to examine the
details of a relationship in order to determine its legal significance. 37 The Commission specifically advocates making registra38
tion available to two people even if they do not live together.
In this context, the Law Commission of Canada is cautious
about ascription, calling it a "blunt policy tool. .. that infringes
upon the value of autonomy." 39 Nonetheless, it does not recommend its elimination. 140 Specifically, it notes that ascription
should be used to prevent the risks of exploitation inherent in a
model that would allow an unmarried partner to prevail in an
economic dispute only in the presence of a contract.1'1
A report from British Columbia proposing model legislation
to govern inter se claims expressed a similar position in greater
detail. 42 The British Columbia Law Institute's Report on Recogat 130-31.
135 Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugalityat 117-22 (cited in note 82).
136 Id at 117-18.
137 Id at 116-20.
138 Id at 118-20.
139 Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugalityat 116 (cited in note 82).
140 It also seems clear that registration schemes could not completely replace the
ascription model that has taken root in Canadian law. Id at 118.
134 Id

141

Id.

142 See British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family
Status, available online at <http://www.bcli.org> (visited May 16, 2004) (hereinafter
"BCLI Report").
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nition of Spousal and Family Status included among its guiding
143
principles both voluntariness and protecting the vulnerable.
"Under a principle of voluntariness, the law should not impose
rights and obligations on people who live together unless either
(a) they (expressly or tacitly) accept those obligations, or (b) another policy... is applicable and. . . should be accorded greater
weight than the principle of voluntariness." 1 The subsequent
principle to which this section refers is protecting the vulnerable,
articulated as follows:
People in a marriage or in a relationship that resembles
marriage may suffer economic prejudice when the relationship ends. They are also in need of protection. Not
recognizing these relationships and not offering the same
legal protections that the community has agreed are necessary in more traditional family units may allow one
party to take unfair advantage of another. It is in these
cases that the principle of voluntariness must sometimes
45
yield to the principle of protecting the vulnerable.
In implementing these principles, the report proposes that those
who have not married or registered their partnership but who
have lived together for more than two years be deemed to be in
"marriage-like relationships." 46 Upon dissolution, they could
request ongoing support under the same principles as married
couples. 47 For family assets, however, if the relationship lasted
less than ten years, such persons would have no automatic right
to equal share upon separation.'4 Rather, they could request a
share of assets based upon "protective legal principles that prevent one person from unjustly benefiting at the expense of another."149 A share of separate property could be awarded "on revised constructive trust principles or to compensate for economic
50
prejudice suffered by reason on the relationship."

143

Id at 6.

144 Id.
145

Id at 13.
Report at 12 (cited in note 142).
Id at 13.

146 BCLI
147

148 See id at 12-13.

149 Id at 13. If the relationship lasted more than ten years, it would be treated as a
marriage for property division purposes.
150 BCLI Report at 13 (cited in note 142).
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A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada accepted a
limit on ascription but failed to recognize the principled approach
of the British Columbia Law Institute. Although some provinces
extend to dissolving unmarried couples the presumptively equal
property division applicable to divorce, Nova Scotia had not done
so, and in Nova Scotia v Walsh'5 1 the Supreme Court of Canada
refused to find this distinction unconstitutional. 15 2 The opinion
denying a presumptively equal share of the man's property to the
woman with whom he had lived for ten years and raised two
children relied on "freedom of choice" arguments, refusing to as-

cribe spousal status to a couple that did not choose

it.153

"People

who marry," the Court wrote, "can be said to freely accept mutual rights and obligations. A decision not to marry should be
respected because it also stems from a conscious choice of the
parties." 54 The Court's leap from the consent required to marry
to the consent to be bound by specific property division laws, and
the concomitant logic that the choice not to marry indicates the
choice not to be bound by those rules, is unconvincing.
The Court noted that the law of constructive trust is still
available to nonmarital partners. 155 I would highlight one other
important element also noted by the Court: the possibility of obtaining a support order upon the dissolution of the relationship. 15 6 No American jurisdiction currently allows such orders
absent a contract between the parties. 57 Nonetheless, in dissent,
Justice L'Heureux-Dube blasted the majority for distinguishing
the already settled right to spousal support from the requested
right to property division. 58 Using the Court's framework for
determining whether a law violates the Canadian Charter, she
wrote:

151 [2002] 102 CRR2d 1 (Can).
152 See id at 1.
153 Id.
154 Id at 67.

155 Walsh, [20021 102 CRR2d at 70-71.
156 Id at 71.
157 The Reporter's Notes state that a few American jurisdictions have stretched contract principles to find an agreement for one party to provide post-relationship support to
the other, but most have not. The Reporter refers to Canadian and Australian law when
noting that 'other closely related legal systems include nonmarital cohabitants within
their definition of 'spouse' for purposes of spousal-support obligations." ALI Principles §
6.06 Reporter's Notes at 943 (cited in note 2).
158 Walsh, [2002] 102 CRR2d at 5-7.
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Extending the benefit of the equal presumption solely to
married cohabitants constitutes a serious attack upon the
dignity of the claimant and all heterosexual cohabitants.
It sends the message that, although the need for a simple
means of dividing the assets on dissolution exists, only
certain people are entitled to the benefit because of a
status wholly unrelated to that need. In short, it demeans
the dignity of an equal to treat him or her with less re159
spect than his or her functional equals.
Because the Court in Walsh failed to recognize that division of
property should be available to compensate for economic damage
incurred by one partner for the benefit of the other and their
children, it failed to do justice the way the British Columbia Law
Institute proposal would.
CONCLUSION

Under current Canadian law, in most respects third parties
and the state must treat married couples and couples who cohabit for specific periods of time identically. Regarding inter se
claims, upon dissolution of either type of relationship, the party
economically disadvantaged by the termination can petition for
spousal support. Provinces may, but need not, extend the presumption of equal division of property to unmarried couples.
In the United States, the federal government extends none
of the economic benefits of marriage to nonmarital couples. 160 A
few states and a substantial number of local governments and
private businesses extend benefits to those who register as domestic partners.' 6 ' Nonmarital partners are rarely recognized
at 131.
one very limited instance, federal law provides a benefit that can go to a nonmarital partner. The Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety Officer's
Benefits Act, 42 USCS § 3796 (2003), provides for payment of a federal death benefit
when a pubic safety officer dies in the line of duty. In the absence of a spouse or child, the
payment goes to whomever the decedent named as his or her life insurance beneficiary.
See id. When this named person is a same-sex or opposite-sex partner, that person will
receive the benefit.
161 California offers the most expansive domestic partnership statute, extending to
registered domestic partners "the same rights, protections and benefits and ... responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law as are granted to and imposed on spouses." Cal
Fain Code § 297.5 (West 2004). Vermont law extends the rights and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples who enter civil unions. See 15 VT Stat Ann, Title 15 Ch 23
(West 2004). Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiary Statute offers couples who are legally prohibited from marrying a small number of the rights and obligations conferred through
marriage. Haw Rev Stat § 572C1-7 (2004). New Jersey is the most recent state to extend
159 Id
160 In
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under common law principles determining, for example, who is
162
entitled to recover for wrongful death or loss of consortium.
When a nonmarital couple separates, no state provides a mechanism to order one party to pay ongoing support to each other, and
only one state permits property division under the rules applica163
ble to divorcing spouses.
Decades ago, Canada began its journey towards accepting
relationships outside of marriage as family. That journey has
culminated in today's widespread acceptance of the principle that
the decision to marry should matter little in distributing rights
and responsibilities, both between partners and between the
couple and the state. Once the United States has moved the
same distance as Canada, it may be appropriate to reconsider
whether ascription for purposes of property division should be
limited to circumstances necessary to account for vulnerability
and avoid exploitation. Until then, the ALI Principles push the
United States in the right direction by making marriage matter
less.

limited benefits to domestic partners. NJ Stat Ann §§ 26:8A-1-12 (West 2004). The Human Rights Campaign website maintains a database of public and private employers
offering domestic partner benefits to their employees, available online at
<http'//www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/WorkLife/GetInformed2/
The Issues/Domestic PartnerBenefitsIntroduction.htm> (visited May 16, 2004). See
also Nancy J. Knauar, Domestic Partnershipand Same-Sex Relationships:A Marketplace
Innovation and a Less than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 Temple Polit & Civ Rts L Rev
337 (1998) (providing an overview of the various types of domestic partnership laws that
exist within the United States).
162 See, for example, Raum v Restaurant Associates Inc, 675 NYS2d 343 (NY App
1998). A notable exception is New Mexico. See Lozoya v Sanchez, 66 P3d 948 (NM 2003).
163 See ALI Principles, § 6.03 Reporter's Notes comment b at 930-35 (cited in note 2).
The Washington Supreme Court extended community property laws to the division of
assets upon the dissolution of an opposite-sex cohabiting relationship in Connell v Francisco, 898 P2d 831 (Wash 1995). An intermediate appeals court recently extended that
ruling to the dissolution of a lesbian couple. Gormley v Robertson, 83 P3d 1042 (Wash App
2004).

